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The money creation process: 
A theoretical and empirical analysis for the US 
 




The aim of this paper is to assess –on both theoretical and empirical grounds–the two main views 
regarding the money creation process, namely the endogenous and exogenous money approaches. 
After analysing the main issues and the related empirical literature, we will apply a VAR and VECM 
methodology to the United States in the period 1959-2016 to assess the causal relationship between 
a number of critical variables that are supposed to determine the money supply, i.e., the monetary 
base, bank deposits and bank loans. The empirical analysis carried out supports several propositions 
of the endogenous money approach. In particular, it shows that for the United States in the years 
1959-2016 (i) bank loans determine bank deposits and (ii) bank deposits in turn determine the 
monetary base. Our conclusion is that money supply is mainly determined endogenously by the 
lending activity of commercial banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Different views on the money creation process have been present in economic theory since its very 
beginning. One view considers money as exogenously determined by monetary authorities through 
changes in the monetary base. Since commercial banks are deemed to extend loans as a multiple of 
the monetary reserves in order to maximise profits, it is argued that money supply – usually identified 
with currency and bank deposits – would fully be under the control of monetary authorities, albeit in 
a close economy. Within this approach, differences arise mainly on the effects of changes in the 
money supply on prices and economic activity. In the quantitative theory followed by Ricardo and 
then developed by authors such as Fisher (1911 and 1930), Marshall (1926), Lavington (1921) and 
Friedman (1956), adjustment of the demand for money to its supply occurs primarily through changes 
in the price level, at least in the long run. On the contrary, in Keynes (1936), as well as in the 
neoclassical synthesis of Hicks (1937) and Modigliani (1944), both the velocity of circulation of 
money and output levels are permitted to vary and the adjustment of the demand for money to its 
supply passes through changes in the interest rate. Up to recent years, the monetary debate focused 
precisely on these issues, in particular on the degree of variability of the velocity of circulation and 
the sensitivity of the demand for money to the interest rates. It was taken for granted that monetary 
authorities would directly shape the quantity of money.  
Another approach, already traceable in Adam Smith (1776: 261; 332-3) and the Banking School 
(cf. e.g. Tooke, 1844), stresses, on the contrary, the endogenous nature of money. Developed by 
Wicksell (1898) and Hayek (1930), and suggested at times by Keynes himself (1930; 1937; 1939), 
this approach rejects the idea that monetary authorities autonomously regulate the money supply and 
highlights the active role played by commercial banks in the money creation process. It also 
emphasises the notion of liquidity instead of money, as well as the role of Central Banks as lenders 
of last resort. This perspective has recently gained increasing consensus in macroeconomics and 
prominent monetary authorities (cf. ECB, 2011; BoE, 2014) have endorsed it when fixing short-term 
interest rates. Due to New-Keynesian models (cf. Gali, 2015; Woodford, 2003), it has become the 
workhorse of Central Bank models and is shared by different streams of thought (cf. for example 
Kaldor, 1982; Moore, 1988; Lavoie, 2014). 
The aim of this paper is to discuss these two approaches to the money creation process on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds by looking at the experience of the United States after the Second 
World War. In Section 2 we will briefly outline the main points at issue in the debate on the exogenous 
or endogenous nature of money whereas in Section 3 we will analyse the empirical literature on 
money multiplier with regard to the United States. We will then go onto empirically test credit 
transmission causality between three critical variables, namely the monetary base, bank deposits and 
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bank loans. Specifically, by considering seasonally adjusted time series starting from January 1959 
and ending in September 2016, we will make use of time series analysis using the VAR (Vector 
Autoregression Model) methodology and cointegration analysis that allow considerations to be made 
regarding the short- and long-run causality between these three variables. Section 4 will introduce the 
empirical analysis, highlighting the main differences in terms of hypotheses, data and methods 
compared with the current literature and in Section 5 we will discuss the main results. Our conclusion 
(Section 6) will be that empirical evidence reveals the existence of causality running from bank loans 
to bank deposits and in turn from deposits to the monetary base. We will also show that, even though 
in the short-run the monetary base may determine the level of bank deposit, bank deposit never 
influences the level of bank loans. In other words, an exogenous increase of the monetary base (e.g. 
quantitative easing programmes) can influence the deposit demand since it rises the amount of 
liquidity held by commercial banks, but the amount of deposit (e.g. new liquidity created by central 
banks) does not affect the level of loan granted by commercial banks to borrowers. This strengthens 
the view that money supply is endogenously determined by the lending activity of commercial banks. 
 
2. Behind the money creation process 
The traditional view on the money creation process starts from account identities, namely the 
definition of money as the sum of currency and bank deposits, and the equality between the monetary 
base and the sum of currency and bank reserves. As known, it follows that the amount of money M 
is equal to the monetary base ܪ multiplied by the so-called money multiplier ݉, in turn equal to: 
 
݉ = ଵା௖௨௖௨ା௥௘         [1] 
 
where ܿݑ is the ratio of currency to bank deposits and ݎ݁ is the bank reserve ratio.i In this perspective, 
it is argued that the monetary authorities may always autonomously set the monetary base ܪ at a level 
that is able to achieve a warranted amount of money ܯ and hence the targeted price level and interest 
rates, with the causal nexus running from ܪ to the bank loans ܮ and bank deposits ܦܤ. 
More precisely, since the rates of interest on bank deposits and loans may influence the money 
multiplier by affecting the ratios cu and re, money supply is conceived as a function of the interest 
rates and the monetary base. Central Banks will set ܪ through open market operations according to 
their objectives and the forecast of the money multiplier ݉, and they may influence the latter also by 
changing reserve requirements. The adjustment of money and credit demands to the available supplies 
is then assured by changes in the price level ܲ and the interest rates, focusing on one or the other 
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according to the time horizon and the specification of the demand function for money (see among 
others, Keynes, 1936; Hansen, 1949; Friedman, 1956; Cagan, 1965, Tobin, 1969).  
This view on the money creation process has been criticised inseveral respects, often by Central 
Bankers themselves, in turn reproached for not having controlled the money growth rate (cf. Blinder, 
1999). It is thus maintained that the money multiplier relation tends to hide the role of interest rates 
in the adjustment process of money demand and supply, and that if ܪ is changed in order to 
compensate for changes inܿݑ and ݎ݁, the monetary base becomes (de facto) endogenous. Moreover, 
it is stressed that ܪ is also affected by the foreign and Treasury channels and that they are not under 
the direct control of monetary authorities (cf. Goodhart, 1975, 136, and 1984: 184; Klein, 1970; 
Kaldor, 1982; Palley, 2002).ii 
However, in addition to money multiplier instability and the influence on ܪ of channels not 
controlled directly by Central Banks, money supply endogeneity is also deduced by the lending 
behaviour of commercial banks and the reaction to it of monetary authorities when acting to stabilise 
the rate of interest (cf. Goodhart, 1984: 38, 40, 73; Wray, 1992; Godley, 1996). 
As Wicksell (1898) observed, in a pure credit system, commercial banks may create money ex-
nihilo or in other terms ‘out of nothing’ (cf. also Werner, 2005; 2014a; 2014b), that is, without any 
need fora prior saving act, the gathering of deposits or a predetermined creation of the monetary base. 
Therefore, credit would find a limit only in the demand for loans. This is so also in a fiat money 
economy to the extent that the bank system has excess reserves and potential credit is not fully 
exploited (cf. Wicksell, 1898: 115), or if the monetary authorities accommodate subsequently the 
reserve requirements of the bank sector.iii In these cases, the quantity of money in circulation will 
primarily depend on the demand for loans, which in turn creates bank deposits. A variation in both 
the velocity of circulation of money and the supply of loans will in fact be able to meet an increase 
in the demand for cash and financing arising from higher wages or a higher desire to spend. This may 
happen without any change in the interest rates if the credit system is sufficiently elastic.iv 
However, the endogenous nature of money also follows on from other reactions occurring in the 
presence of demand pressures on financial markets. As stressed by the Radcliffe Report (1959), 
liquidity shortness or credit ceilings stimulate financial innovations with the development of fringe 
institutions, second money markets and new financial instruments. Liability management and 
securitisation are examples of this kind of reaction that Central Banks may influence only indirectly, 
for instance by regulating interest rates on time deposits and imposing minimum capital adequacy 
ratios. Moreover, the bank system usually first satisfies the demand for loans at given interest rates 
and then looks for the required reserve (cf. Holmes, 1969: 73). In these circumstances, Central Banks 
tend to accommodate commercial banks’ demand for reserves in exchange for other assets in order 
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not to lose control over the interest rates. Finally, Central Banks have difficulty in changing the 
quantity of money at will. In particular, there is an asymmetry in this respect: while it may be easy to 
sustain financial intermediation by increasing the monetary base,v it is difficult to reduce the quantity 
of money (cf. Holmes, 1969: 68; Moore, 1988: 15), primarily because economic units possess 
unutilised lines of credits in advance and money is not immediately quantity-constrained by Central 
bankers. 
Of course, Central bankers may decide to reduce the monetary base, for instance by selling bonds 
owned by the Central Bank. In this case, however, the non-borrowed reserves fall and there is 
competition to acquire funds in excess of bank deposits.vi This necessarily starts a phase of increasing 
interest rates and if the Central Banks do not accommodate the bank reserve requirements at the 
discount window, it may even lead to a liquidity crisis (Palley, 1987; Moore, 1988; Wray, 1989). As 
stated above, Central Banks face two concomitant challenges, namely to not lose control of interest 
ratesvii and to act as a lender of last resort. For both reasons, they tend to accommodate bank reserves 
at a given interest rate which means that ܪ and ܯ cannot be set independentlyof the targeted interest 
rate (cf. Goodhart, 1984: 209 and 212) and that the Central Banks’s influence on the amount of money 
depends on the effect that changes in their policy interest rate will have on the structure of interest 
rates and the sensitivity of both loans and expenditure to these rates. 
As also stressed in recent studies by the Bank of England (cf. McLeay et al., 2014: 21; Jakab and 
Kumhof, 2015), Central Banks therefore normally set the rate of interest rather than the amount of 
reserves and money supply stems mostly from the lending activity of commercial banks. In this 
activity, given the rate of interest fixed by the Central Bank, the bank system regulates the interest 
rates on loans by adding to the former a mark-up that is influenced by the degree of competition in 
the sector and the interest rates paid on time deposits, and covers, among other things, loan risks and 
general expenses (cf. Goodhart, 1984; Palley 1987). With these lending rates, the bank system meets 
the demand for loans according to its liquidity preference and the borrower credibility.viii 
It is beyond the aims of this paper to analyse the determinants of the demand for loans, albeit 
specifying that, whether influenced by expected profits for firms and disposable income for 
households, as well as by the interest rates on other financing instruments, its sensitivity to lending 
interest rates is uncertain and variable according to the credit typologies.ix However, it is worth noting 
that it is the solvent or creditworthy demand for loans (cf. Wolfson, 1996; Fontana and Setterfield, 
2009) that the bank system satisfies, reflecting the requirements and collateral that borrowers need to 
access credit according to banks’ perceived risks. 
The casual nexus between the monetary base, bank deposits and credit is thus reverted in the 
endogenous approach to money creation process. The effective credit supplies ܮ݅ provided at the 
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given lending interest rates by the bank system determine the amount of bank deposits ܦ and thus the 
amount of the monetary base ܪ demanded by commercial banks to the Central bank. It corresponds 
to the reserves ܴ required to guarantee convertibility of deposits in liquid assets, which will be greater 
the greater the reserve ratio ݎ݁ and which the Central Banks usually accommodate at a certain fixed 
policy interest rate. 
 
3. The empirical studies on the nexus between loans and bank reserves 
Summing up, while the exogenous approach considers money supply as fixed by Central Banks 
setting the monetary base,x the endogenous approach argues that money supply adjusts itself to the 
demand for it, as stemming especially from the demand for credit met by commercial bank and the 
financing needs of the Treasury (cf. Kaldor, 1982; Moore, 1979; 1988). It is on these grounds that the 
empirical literature has discussed the causal links between income, money supply and the monetary 
base in the two identities 
 




ܯܸ = ܲ ௥ܻ         [3] 
 
where ܸ is the velocity of circulation of money and ௥ܻ the real income.  
In this respect, for the United States, several studies have ascribed to changes in ܪ the greatest 
part of those in the money supply ܯ defined as the sum of currency and bank deposits. According to 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963; 1982) and Cagan (1965), in the long-run it would account for 90 per 
cent of money supply changes whereas for Brunner and Metzler (1964) it is 85 per cent. In both cases, 
the money multiplier is deemed to be on average substantially stable unlike during the cycle (cf. also 
Burger, 1971; Brunner, 1973; Johannes and Rasche, 1981),xiand changes in ܪ and ܯwould be nearly 
proportional, with the coefficient of correlation equal to 0.88 (cf. Cagan; 1965), at least in the period 
1879-1919.  
As Cagan (1965) himself admits, the correlation is lower, however, in the subsequent decades, 
when a slight positive relation emerges between money supply and the rate of interest (cf. also 
Courchene and Kelly, 1971 for the situation in Canada). This would reflect a direct nexus going from 
the price level to the interest rate and then to money supply because a higher interest rate on bank 
deposits would reduce public preference for currency and increase time deposits against sight deposits 
7  
and therefore the money multiplier. It is also admitted that the role of money multiplier relative to 
high powered money increases during cyclical fluctuations (cf. Cagan, 1965: 261 and 276) or when 
the pegging of interest rates is abandoned in favour of price stabilisation and result in erratic changes 
in both the rate of interest and the money supply, as in the years 1979-1983.xii 
By itself, however, the high correlation between money supply and the monetary base does not 
give us any suggestion to the causal nexus between these two variables, as Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963: 686) acknowledged. Moreover, neither the fact that Central Banks have the power to change 
the money base nor the fact that changes in the money supply anticipate investment and income 
during the cycle bear money exogeneity. In the former, it ought to be established that the monetary 
base does not adapt itself to the demand. In the latter, it stems indeed from the financing process of 
consumption and investments (cf. Tobin, 1970; Davidson and Weintraub, 1973). Rather, the results 
of Kydland and Prescott (1990) that broad money aggregates led the cycle whereas base money 
aggregate lags it may be a first indication that the causal nexus goes in the other direction, from credit 
supply to the monetary base, with the supply of open-market liabilities being perfectly elastic (cf. 
Bernanke and Geitler, 1995). 
In the last twenty-five years, a number of econometric studies have tried to empirically assess the 
direction of causality between credit supply and the monetary base. Moore (1988: 106-108, 157 and 
163) argued that the monetary base is not statistically exogenous and that the Granger method shows 
that for a given bank lending rate the demand for loans causes the monetary base and money supply 
(cf. also Feige and McGee, 1977; and Moore and Stuttman, 1982). Similar results emerge for other 
developed countries when applying VAR and VECM econometric methods (cf. for instance Arestis, 
1987; Badarudin et al., 2013; Carpenter and Demiralp, 2012; Foster, 1994; Holtemoller, 2003; 
Howells and Hussein, 1998; Palacio Vera, 2001). In particular, Howells and Hussein (1998) applied 
a causality test within a vector error-correction model (VECM) and found some empirical evidence 
for money supply endogeneity in G-7 countries. Recently, Badarudin et al. (2013) found evidence of 
money endogeneity in G-7 economies by applying both a VECM and a trivariate vector 
autoregression model (VAR). 
In the following sections, we will apply VAR and VECM econometric methods to the United 
States for the period 1959-2016 considering the time series of the monetary base, bank deposits and 
bank loans. These techniques will allow us to make considerations regarding the causality between 
those variables that reveal a nexus running from bank loans to bank deposits and in turn from deposits 
to the monetary base. As we will see, it confirms the view that money supply is to a great extent 
endogenously determined by the lending activity of commercial banks. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
The econometric analysis carried out in this paper is based on time series aggregate monthly data 
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and concerns US countries. We make use 
of the total demand for deposits (LDEMDEP), the bank credit granted by US commercial banks 
(LCREDIT) and the monetary base (LBM)xiii. All time series considered are seasonally adjusted and 
start from January 1959 and end in September 2016. Since all variables assume positive values, they 
are transformed into a logarithmic form. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
We will apply times series models able to take into consideration and solve issues related to 
endogeneity. In particular, by using VAR and VECM methodology, all variables are estimated 
endogenously and these models also allow us to detect and estimate causality between LDEMDEP, 
LBM and LCREDIT. In order to arrange the data accurately, we implement the following steps. First, 
we select the optimal lag length of our models by minimising the Schwarz (1978) Bayesian 
Information Criteria (SBC). Second, in order to understand the stationarity (or the order of 
integration) of considered variables, a standard unit root test is conducted on selected series. More 
specifically, the Phillips and Perron (1988) test is implemented since it is more powerful than the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Third, if the variables are non-
stationary, a Johansen test is carried out by means of Johansen multivariate cointegration (Johansen, 
1988). Finally, VAR and VECM econometric techniques allow us to estimate short- and long-run 
causality between the variables of interest. 
Results concerning unit root and cointegration tests led us to use alternative econometric methods 
to test short- and long-run causality. These methodologies have been developed by Granger (1969, 
1988), Engle and Granger (1987), Sims et al. (1990), Mosconi and Giannini (1992), Toda and Phillips 
(1993, 1994), Toda and Yamamoto (1995), and Rambaldi and Doran (1996). In particular, if the time 
series are I(1) but not cointegrated, we can utilise the Granger non-Causality test based on 
differentiated VAR (Sims et al. 1990; Toda and Phillips, 1993). However, in order to apply a VAR 
model, we have to eliminate the non-stationary stochastic trend by using the first-order differences. 
Consequently, applying first-order differences between non-cointegrated variables allows us to use 
the VAR model and then to estimate a Granger non-Causality test. The VAR model applied to non-
stationary and non-cointegrated times series is represented in equation [4]: 
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∆ݕ௧ = ߚ଴ + ෍ ߚଵ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
∆ݕ௧ି௜ + ෍ ߚଶ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ




Equally, if the series are I(1) and cointegrated, a VECM model has to be estimated (Engle and 
Granger, 1987 and Granger, 1988). The model is specified by equation [5]: 
 
∆ݕ௧ = ߚ଴ + ෍ ߚଵ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
∆ݕ௧ି௜ + ෍ ߚଶ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ




where ݕ௧represents the dependent variable, ݔ௧is the independent variable, ܧܥ௧ି௜is the error-correction 
term and ߝ௧ is the error term.  
Since in the VECM model all variables are estimated as endogenous variables, the causality can 
be estimated by choosing alternatively the dependent and the independent variables. Unlike VAR 
models, the VECM allows us to assess both short-run and long-run causality (Engle and Granger, 
1987). Short-run causality is tested by using the Wald-test that also shows us the transmission 
channels. Conversely, long-run causality is tested by analysing the error-correction coefficient (ߚଷ in 
equation 2). If such coefficient is negative and also statistically significant, we can claim that a long-
run causality moving from ݔ௧ to ݕ௧ exists. 
Moreover, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) suggest estimating a VAR model even if the series are 
integrated or cointegrated. As maintained by Toda and Yamamoto (1995, p. 245): “we can apply the 
usual lag selection procedure […] to a possibly integrated or cointegrated VAR. Having chosen a lag 
length ݇ , we then estimate a (݇ + ݀௠௔௫)th-order VAR where ݀ ௠௔௫ is the maximal order of integration 
that we suspect may occur in the process.” In other words, we increase artificially the optimal VAR 
lag length ݇ by the maximal order of integration (݀௠௔௫)xiv and we arrange the VAR model in levels 
(regardless of the order of integration) without convert series into first differences. If all series are 
I(1), ݀௠௔௫ is equal to 1 and we have to estimate the levels VAR with one extra lag for each variable 
in each equation. Practically, we have to increase the lag, introducing in the VAR the extra lagged 
variables as an exogenous component of the model. As suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
methodology, the VAR (݇, ݀௠௔௫) can be represented by the equation [6]: 
 












In equation [6], ߚ଴is a vector representing the intercept, ߚ௜is the matrix of the coefficient of the 
delayed variables by the optimal lag length ݇,  ߚ௝ is the matrix of extra lagged variables and vector ߝ 
represents white noise. The granger non-Causality test in VAR methodology applied to the equation 
[6] is based on the following null hypothesis: 
 
ܪ଴: ߚ௜ଵ =  ߚ௜ଶ = .  .  . =  ߚ௜௞ = 0 
 
where ߚ௜௞represents the coefficients of the first summation in equation [6], that is, the coefficients of 
the optimal lag length variables. When ߚ is equal to zero, there is no short-run causality running from 
the independent to the dependent variable. 
In this paper, variables used within VAR and VECM model are: the demand for bank deposits 
(LDEMDEP), the monetary base (LBM) and the bank credit (LCREDIT). These models allow us to 
investigate both short- and long-run causality and to guarantee the stability and robustness of our 
findings by introducing suitable dummy variables. 
 
4.3. Dummy variables and Chow test 
In order to further check the stability of our findings and robustness of our model, we will introduce 
appropriate dummy variables that allow us to take into consideration external shock in the 
management of US monetary policy. In order to do so, we first carry out a theoretical and historical 
analysis of Fed monetary policy decisions. Second, we further assess the statistical significance of 
the breakpoints considered noteworthy, by testing such hypothetical changes using the Chow 
breakpoint test within the VAR model. 
During the Eighties, the Fed, in order to control the high inflation rate, changed its operating 
procedures: from the interest rate setting to monetary aggregate targeting (Mishkin, 2000). Indeed, in 
that period, the Fed implemented monetary policy aimed at controlling the amount of non-borrowed 
reserves and other monetary aggregates (i.e., M1 and M2) leaving the interest rate determination to 
interplay between the supply of and demand for money. This specific monetary policy was launched 
by Paul Volcker in October 1979 when he announced a tight control over money supply. Although 
during those years, the control over monetary aggregates became gradually less tight (for example, 
in February 1987, the Fed dismissed the monetary target over M1), it permanently ended in July 1993. 
Due to the high interest rates, volatility occurred especially between 1979 and 1983 and the Fed, 
under the chair of Alan Greenspan, ceased to implement any monetary policy based on the monetary 
aggregate targeting (Mishkin, 1995) and restarted setting directly the interest rate over monetary 
reserves.xv 
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Moreover, since the intensification of the US financial crisis in 2007 and the fall in the US GDP 
in the fall of 2008, the Fed launched an unconventional monetary policy (i.e. quantitative easing 
programmes) in order to support financial market conditions and limit the economic slowdown 
(Engen et al., 2015). Starting from September 2008, the Fed rapidly expanded its balance sheet by 
purchasing several types of asset such as mortgage-backed securities and Treasury securities (Hetzel, 
2009). The Fed lent a huge amount of liquidity to the financial institutions by means of the discount 
window and increased its balance sheet that “went from about $800 billion before September 15, 
2008, to more than $2,000 trillion at year-end 2008.” (Hetzel, 2009, p. 217) The implementation of 
such unconventional monetary policies increased US monetary base (see Figure 1) with the aim of 
increasing the liquidity in the overall economic system and promoting the decline of money market 
rates (Bernanke, 2009). 
 
 Figure 1. US Monetary Base (FRED dataset, from January 1959 to September 2016)  
Due to the theoretical and historical analysis of Fed monetary policy decisions discussed above, 
by using the Chow breakpoint test, we assess if October 1979 and September 2008 represent 
exogenous shifts in the conduct of monetary policy. The Chow test is based on the null hypothesis of 
“No breaks at specified breakpoints”. If the p-value associated with the considered breakpoints is less 
than 10%, we reject the null hypothesis and affirm that a dummy variable can be introduced in that 
specific period. 
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As presented in Table 1, the selected breakpoints – October 1979 and September 2008 – are 
statistically significant since p-values are less than 1% or at most 5%. Such results allow us to reject 
the null hypothesis and introduce suitable dummy variables for the specified breakpoints. 
 
Table 1 Chow Breakpoint test 
Variables 1979M10 F-statistic Log likelihood ratio Wald Statistic  
LMB-LCREDIT-LDEMDEP 1.951038** 34.03732*** 33.16765** 
Variables 2008M09 F-statistic Log likelihood ratio Wald Statistic  
LMB-LCREDIT-LDEMDEP 20.25245*** 290.9213*** 344.2917*** 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; H0: No breaks at specified breakpoints  
The reasoning and results presented above seem appropriate to introduce dummy variables to 
suggest that – in some limited periods – the monetary base could be exogenously targeted. In 
particular, during high inflation eras, financial instability periods and prolonged recessions, the Fed 
has undertaken unconventional monetary policy measures with the aim of exogenously setting the 
monetary base and then the money supply. For these reasons, the change in the conduct of US 
monetary policy during the Eighties and the Fed autonomous increase in the monetary base after the 
spread of the US financial turmoil in 2008 will be taken into account in the VAR and VECM 
estimations via the introduction of two dummy variables. The first starts in October 1979 and ends in 
July 1993 and the second starts in September 2008 and ends in September 2016.xvi 
 
5. Findings and discussion 
The presentation of findings will be divided into two sub-sections. In the first, we focus on the 
discussion of results related to the estimation of the baseline VAR and VECM model concerning the 
relationship between the bank credit, the bank deposits and the monetary base. In the second, we 
discuss the existing relationship between the considered previous variables by introducing suitable 
dummy variables to the VAR and VECM model. The latter analysis allows us to understand the 
effects of both the change in the conduct of the monetary policy during the Eighties and the monetary 
policy instruments implemented by the Fed after the outbreak of the US financial and economic crisis. 
The second estimation will also help us determine the stability and robustness of our findings. 
Moreover, in both sub-sections, we will discuss both the times series properties and the results of 
specific causality tests. 
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5.1. Monetary base, bank deposits and bank loans (the baseline model) 
Results for the monetary base, bank deposits and bank loans estimated in the baseline model are 
presented and discussed in this sub-section. The first results involve the properties of the selected 
time series. The optimum lag length is five and is estimated by minimising the Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criteria (SBC). Furthermore, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test results suggest that all 
considered variables are not stationary at levels, but that they become stationary at the first 
differences.xvii Since all variables treated are not stationary at level, but become stationary at the first 
differences, we perform the Johansen Cointegration Test in order to understand whether a 
cointegrating equation exists between all three variables. In short, we are testing if a stationary linear 
trend occurs between the non-stationary variables. 
The Johansen Cointegration Test indicates the existence of one cointegrating equation between 
LBM, LDEMDEP and LCREDIT in the US. Precisely, as shown in Table 2, the p-value 
corresponding to the Trace and to the Eigenvalue is less than 5% (Trace of 35.05559) and 1% 
(Eigenvalue of 26.03019) respectively, suggesting that LBM, LDEMDEP and LCREDIT are 
cointegrated.xviii 
 
Table 2 Johansen Cointegration test 
Variables Trace Eigenvalue Lag 
LMB – LCREDIT – LDEMDEP 35.05559** 26.03019*** 5 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Trace represents the Trace Test statistics and Eigenvalue is the Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistics.  
Due to the existence of a cointegrated equation, we can argue that there is a long-run relationship 
between LBM, LDEMDEP and LCREDIT. We can therefore estimate a VECM model that allows us 
to determine both short- and long-run causality between the considered variables. Long-run causality 
is detected through the coefficient of the error-correction term (ߚଷ in equation 2). If the coefficient is 
negative and also statistically significant, we can conclude that the causality runs from the 
independent to the dependent variable. As shown by the first column in Table 3, we will test if the 
independent variables jointly determine the dependent variable. Alternatively, short-run causality is 
estimated through the Wald test that also allows us to estimate the transmission channels. 
The VECM long-run results are summarised in Table 3. In order to understand causality, we need 
the value of the coefficient ߚଷand the respective significance. As seen in Table 3, the causality – in 
the long-run – runs from LCREDIT and LDEMDEP to LBM since there is only one ߚଷthat is negative 
and also statistically significant. Sinceߚଷ – equal to -0.005466 – is significant at the 0,01 probability 
level, we reject the null hypothesis maintaining that the parameter is different from zero and conclude 
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that a statistically significant long-run causality running from LCREDIT and LDEMDEP to LBM 
exists. On the contrary, ߚଷ – equal to -0.001118 (see Table 3) – is negative but not statistically 
significant when we test the long-run causality running from LBM and LDEMDEP to LCREDIT. We 
can therefore conclude that there is no long-run causality running from LBM and LDEMDEP to 
LCREDIT. 
 
Table 3 Results of Error-Correction Models (Long-run Causality Test) Long-run coefficients t-Statistic Lag Long-run  INDEPENDENT V. DEPENDENT V. ߚଷ CONCLUSION 
LCREDIT & LDEMDEP LBM -0.005466*** [-2.50547] 5 LCREDIT & LDEMDEP 
 
LBM LBM & LDEMDEP LCREDIT -0.001118 [-1.48493] 5 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; H0: no long-run causality; INDEPENDENT V. represents the independent variable column; DEPENDENT V. represents the dependent variable column. The arrows show the causality direction: single arrows represent one way causality and double arrows represent bidirectional causality.  
Table 4 Results of Error-Correction Models (Short-run Causality: Wald Test) 
Short-run coefficients Lag Short-run INDEPENDENT V. DEPENDENT V. χ2 test CONCLUSION 
LCREDIT LDEMDEP 10.91368* 5 LCREDIT  LDEMDEP LDEMDEP LCREDIT 8.639373 5 
LDEMDEP LBM 32.80177*** 5 LDEMDEP  LBM LBM LDEMDEP 79.73530*** 5 
LCREDIT LBM 35.89287*** 5 LCREDIT  LBM LBM LCREDIT 6.409055 5 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. H0: no short-run causality; INDEPENDENT V. represents the independent variable column; DEPENDENT V. represents the dependent variable column. The arrows show the causality direction: single arrows represent one way causality and double arrows represent bidirectional causality.  
In Table 4, we show the VECM short-run causality results. By means of the Wald test, short-run 
causality is explained by the joint significance of the lagged independent variables. The Wald test is 
based on the null hypothesis according to which the coefficients of lagged variables are equal to zero, 
that is, there is no short-run causality. If the probability (p-value) related to the coefficients of the 
exogenous variables is less than 5% (at most less than 10%), we reject the null hypothesis and claim 
the existence of short-run causality. The results of the Wald test, represented in Table 4, show that 
LCREDIT causes in the short-run both LDEMDEP (significant at 10%) and LBM (significant at 1%). 
A bidirectional causality is estimated between LDEMDEP and LBM (significant at 1%).The Wald 
test allows us to estimate a feasible credit transmission channel that could be summarised as follow: 
the loans provided by commercial banks determine the level of bank deposits and in turn bank 
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deposits influence the monetary base. Nevertheless, we have also found that bank loans directly affect 
the level of the monetary base and the base money is able to determine the level of bank deposit in 
the short-run. 
Finally, we also apply Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology and we estimate the Granger 
non-Causality test in order to confirm and strengthen the VECM short-run results. The Granger non-
Causality test applied to a trivariate VAR further validates the existing relationship between LBM, 
LDEMDEP and LCREDIT.xix As shown in Table 5, the Granger non-Causality test applied in the 
trivariate VAR model shows that bank credit influences both the demand for bank deposit (significant 
at 10%) and the monetary base (significant at 1%).Moreover, bidirectional causality is estimated 
between the demand for bank deposit and the monetary base (significant at 1%).Finally, neither bank 
deposits nor the monetary base determine bank loans. The Granger non-Causality test, estimated with 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology, confirms the Wald tests results found through the baseline 
VECM model (cf. Table 4).  
 
Table 5 Results of the Trivariate VAR (Short-run Causality: Granger non-Causality Test) 
Short-run coefficients Lag Short-run INDEPENDENT V. DEPENDENT V. χ2 test CONCLUSION 
LCREDIT LDEMDEP 10.98461* 5 LCREDIT  LDEMDEP LDEMDEP LCREDIT 8.503751 5 
LDEMDEP LBM 32.95138*** 5 LDEMDEP  LBM LBM LDEMDEP 80.07952*** 5 
LCREDIT LBM 33.31823*** 5 LCREDIT  LBM LBM LCREDIT 5.898382 5 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; H0: the independent does not Granger cause the dependent variable; INDEPENDENT V. represents the independent variable column; DEPENDENT V. represents the dependent variable column. The arrows show the causality direction: single arrows represent one way causality and double arrows represent bidirectional causality.  
The long- and short-run causality results, estimated by means of VECM methodology applied in 
US, support the Endogenous money view since the monetary base is an endogenous variable in the 
long-run, being determined by bank loans and bank deposits. Also VECM short-run results, along 
with their interpretation of the credit transmission channel, support the endogenous money theory 
since bank loans determine the level of bank deposits which in turn influence the level of the monetary 
base. In addition, the Granger non-Causality test applied to a trivariate VAR confirms results found 
through the Wald test estimated in the VECM model. Finally, even though we have shown that in the 
short-run the monetary base can determine the level of bank deposit, we can also assert that the bank 
deposit never influences the level of bank loans. In other words, an exogenous increase of the 
monetary base (e.g. quantitative easing programmes) can influence the deposit demand since it 
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increases the amount of liquidity held by commercial banks. However, this amount of deposit (e.g. 
new liquidity created by central banks) does not affect the level of loan granted by commercial banks 
to borrowers. Consequently, such a result could be explained by the important role played by the 
creditworthy demand for loans. In particular, according to the endogenous money view, in order to 
enter the money in the real economy, the demand for loans has to increase (firms and households) 
instead of the supply of funds (i.e. the monetary base and bank deposits). In other words, if during a 
period of economic slump the central bank wants to increase the amount of money entering the real 
economy, our results suggest that credit demand has to be stimulated rather than the supply of funds. 
 
5.2. Monetary base, bank loans and bank deposits (with dummy variables) 
In order to assess the stability and the robustness of empirical results estimated in paragraph 4.1, 
as well as the effect of Walker strict control over the money supply and the effect of unconventional 
monetary policies implemented by the Fed (e.g. quantitative easing programmes) after the outbreak 
of the US financial and economic crisis. In order to do so, we first estimate a new cointegrated 
equation by implementing the Johansen Cointegration Test and by adding the two dummy variables 
(see Sub-section 3.3) as an exogenous component of the test. Second, we estimate the causal 
relationship between LBM, LDEMDEP and LCREDIT by means of a VAR and VECM model and 
introduce the two considered dummy variables. 
The Johansen Cointegration Test indicates the existence of one cointegrating equation between 
LBM, LDEMDEP and LCREDIT in the US. In particular, as shown in Table 6, the value of the Trace 
and the Eigenvalue allows us to maintain that a long-run relationship between LBM, LDEMDEP and 
LCREDIT exists. The Trace and the Eigenvalue being equal to 107.1979 (significant at 1%) and to 
95.83045(significant at 1%) respectively, suggests that LBM, LDEMDEP and LCREDIT are 
cointegrated (see also footnote xviii). We can therefore assert that the introduction of dummy 
variables does not change the existing long-run relationship between the monetary base, bank deposits 
and bank loans. 
 
Table 6 Johansen Cointegration test with dummy variables 
Variables Trace Eigenvalue Lag 
LMB – LCREDIT – LDEMDEP 107.1979 *** 95.83045 *** 5 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Trace represents the Trace Test statistics and Eigenvalue is the Maximal Eigenvalue Test statistics.  
The VECM long-run results are shown in Table 7. The long-run causality is detected by the sign 
of the coefficient ߚଷ and the respective significance. As seen in Table 7, the long-run causality runs 
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from LCREDIT and LDEMDEP to LBM since there is only one ߚଷthat is negative and also 
statistically significant. Sinceߚଷis equal to -0.038969 and significant at the 0,01 probability level 
when we test the long-run causality running from LCREDIT and LDEMDEP to LBM, we reject the 
null hypothesis of not long-run causality. Since the parameter is statistically different from zero, we 
can conclude that a significant long-run relationship running from LCREDIT and LDEMDEP to LBM 
exists. On the contrary, ߚଷ – equal to -0.001395 – is not significant when we test the long-run causality 
running from LDEMDEP and LBM to LCREDIT. Consequently, we accept the null hypothesis 
arguing that there is no long-run causality running from LBM and LDEMDEP to LCREDIT. The 
findings, concerning the long-run causality estimated by means of VECM model with dummy 
variable, confirm the empirical result of the baseline model (cf. Table 3). 
 
Table 7 Results of Error-Correction Models with dummy variables (Long-run Causality Test) Long-run coefficients t-Statistic Lag Long-run  INDEPENDENT V. DEPENDENT V. ߚଷ CONCLUSION 
LCREDIT & LDEMDEP LBM -0.038969*** [-9.81204] 5 LCREDIT & LDEMDEP 
 
LBM LBM & LDEMDEP LCREDIT -0.001395 [-0.95459] 5 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; H0: no long-run causality; INDEPENDENT V. represents the independent variable column; DEPENDENT V. represents the of the dependent variable column. The arrows show the causality direction: single arrows represent one way causality and double arrows represent bidirectional causality.  
Table 8 Results of Error-Correction Models with dummy variables (Short-run Causality: Wald Test) 
Short-run coefficients Lag Short-run INDEPENDENT V. DEPENDENT V. χ2 test CONCLUSION 
LCREDIT LDEMDEP 10.85151* 5 LCREDIT  LDEMDEP LDEMDEP LCREDIT 8.459165 5 
LDEMDEP LBM 27.54782*** 5 LDEMDEP  LBM LBM LDEMDEP 67.68745*** 5 
LCREDIT LBM 34.07941*** 5 LCREDIT  LBM LBM LCREDIT 6.074407 5 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. H0: no short-run causality; INDEPENDENT V. represents the independent variable column; DEPENDENT V. represents the dependent variable column. The arrows show the causality direction: single arrow represents one way causality and double arrows represent bidirectional causality.  
In Table 8, we point out the VECM short-run results estimated by means of the Wald test. The 
results of Wald test show that LCREDIT causes in the short-run both LDEMDEP (significant at 10%) 
and LBM (significant at 1%). A bidirectional short-run causality is also estimated between 
LDEMDEP and LBM (significant at 1%).The results estimated by means of the Wald test within the 
VECM model with the dummy variables confirm results of the baseline model (cf. Table 4).  
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Finally, we apply Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology and Granger non-Causality test in 
order to confirm and further strengthen the short-run VECM and VAR results. The Granger non-
Causality test applied to a trivariate VAR validates the existing relationship between LCREDIT, 
LDEMDEP and LBM estimated in paragraph 4.1. As pointed out in Table 9, results of the causality 
estimation show that bank credit influences both the demand for bank deposit (significant at 10%) 
and the monetary base (significant at 1%). Furthermore, a bidirectional causality is also confirmed 
between the demand for bank deposit and the monetary base (both significant at 1%). Finally, neither 
bank deposits nor the monetary base influence the amount of bank loans granted by commercial banks 
to borrowers. The Granger non-Causality test, estimated with Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
methodology in the trivariate VAR within dummy variables, confirms the short-run causality 
estimated in the baseline trivariate VAR (cf. Table 5). 
 
Table 9 Results of the Trivariate VAR with dummy variables (Short-run Causality: Granger non-Causality Test) 
Short-run coefficients Lag Short-run INDEPENDENT V. DEPENDENT V. χ2 test CONCLUSION 
LCREDIT LDEMDEP 10.17444* 5 LCREDIT  LDEMDEP LDEMDEP LCREDIT 8.541842 5 
LDEMDEP LBM 27.58556*** 5 LDEMDEP  LBM LBM LDEMDEP 71.51983*** 5 
LCREDIT LBM 29.31383*** 5 LCREDIT  LBM LBM LCREDIT 5.333263 5 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; H0: the independent does not Granger cause the dependent variable; INDEPENDENT V. represents the independent variable column; DEPENDENT V. represents the dependent variable column; The arrows show the causality direction: single arrows represent one way causality and double arrows represent bidirectional causality.  
Finally, even after the introduction of dummy variables, both the VECM model and the trivariate 
VAR confirm all findings of the baseline VECM and the trivariate VAR model both in the short and 
the long-run (see paragraph 4.1.). Consequently, these results allow us to assert that the model 
estimated is robust and stable and allow us to affirm that empirical evidence confirms the endogenous 
money view. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The notion according to which in the economic system the quantity of money is set by exogenous 
and autonomous decisions of the central bank – as usually affirmed by the exogenous money theory 
– has for a long time symbolised a milestone in the monetary economic literature. Recently, the 
endogenous money theory has gained momentum in the international debate by proposing an 
alternative view in order to explain the money creation process in modern economies. In this paper, 
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we have tested the abovementioned theories in the US for the 1959-2016 period in order to answer 
the following research question: is the money supply exogenously set by the Fed, or is it endogenously 
determined by the lending activity of commercial banks? 
The analysis carried out in this paper shows us that in the United States the money creation process 
is mainly driven by commercial banks and their lending activities geared towards firms and 
households. In particular, the quantity of money in circulation is a residual of the money supply 
process since the monetary base is driven by the demand for and supply of loans. Furthermore, the 
VAR and VECM model implemented with dummy variables confirm that an exogenous increase of 
the monetary base such as that dictated in recent years by unconventional Fed monetary policies are 
unable to channel the liquidity into the real economy. Although we have found short-run causality 
moving from the monetary base to the bank deposit, we can in fact also assert that the volume of 
loans provided by commercial banks is not influenced by the quantity of bank deposit and the 
monetary base. In other words, exogenous monetary policies based on control of the supply of money 
– such as quantitative easing–can positively affect only the amount of liquidity held by commercial 






Total Demand Deposits: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEMDEPSL?cid=25 (LDEMDEP) 
Bank Credit at All Commercial Banks: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LOANINV (LCREDIT) 
Monetary Base: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AMBSL (LBM) 
 
Appendix B. 
We attach in these two subparagraphs the results of the unit root test (Phillips-Perron) and the optimal 
lag selection. In the following subparagraphs, we show the results for the monetary base, bank credit 
and total demand deposits. 
 
B.1. Monetary base (LBM), bank loans (LCREDIT) and bank deposits (LDEMDEP) 
B.1.1. Unit root test (Phillips-Perron):  
H0: variable at level has a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test 
Variables Intercept Trend & Intercept None Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value 
LBM 1.555922 0.9995 -1.701162 0.7500 6.734733 1.0000 
LDEMDEP 1.764828 0.9997 0.205956 0.9981 3.908362 1.0000 
LCREDIT -2.236812 0.1935 0.062755 0.9969 11.98098 1.0000  
B.1.2. Unit root test (Phillips-Perron):  
H0: variable at first difference has a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test 
Variables Intercept Trend & Intercept None Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value Adj. t-statistic P-value 
LBM -13.49965 0.000 -13.46336 0.000 -13.52851 0.000 
LDEMDEP -26.25175 0.000 -26.20647 0.000 -26.91278 0.000 







B.1.2. We conduct the optimal lag length by minimising the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria 
(SBC) 
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i As specified by Jordon (1969), the formula of the money multiplier ݉ is indeed more complex, namely (1 +ܿݑ)/[ݎ݁(1 + ݐ + ݃) + ܿݑ], when also taking into account bank reserves on time deposits ݐ and US government deposits ݃ that are not included in the definition of ܯ1. This would be relevant if the Central Bank were to forecast ݉ in order to get a targeted amount of ܯ, since ݐ is strongly influenced by the rate of interest and bank competition. ii Monetary liabilities of public sector change with changes in public sector deficit, operations on marketable debt, transactions in non-marketable debt, funds to pay offs on maturing debt and external flows. iii Cf. also Wicksell ([1901] 1935: 24, 42-44 and 142-3) when he maintains that even in a gold money economy money supply may adapt to its demand when there are other means of payment besides gold and discusses the validity of the quantity theory of money.  iv Cf. Hayek (1930), who stresses that the bank sector may satisfy an increase in the demand for credit without an increase in the interest rate, obtaining liquidity by lowering the ratio of reserves to bank deposits and selling assets. It is only when Central Bank increases the discount rate and does not accommodate the fall in bank reserves that there is an increase in interest rates. Cf. also Moore (1989) who specifies that credit money is demand determined and there is therefore no need for a change in the interest rate to adjust money demand to the supply. v When not offsetting a previous credit expansion, an increase in the monetary base usually leads to the purchase of securities and the lowering of their interest rates, raising both the liabilities and assets of the banking system. However, unlike what has been stated by Brunner and Meltzer (1964), commercial banks may also hold excess reserves especially during a deep crisis when reserve opportunity cost may be zero or even negative, or when the borrowing cost at the discount window is not linear and increasing (cf. Palley, 1987). vi Notice that deposits are destroyed every time the banking system (included the Central Banks) sells assets to households, firms or the Government sector.  vii If Central Bank does not offer non-borrowed reserves at a certain interest rate and there is an increasing demand for reserves in the interbank market or at the discount window, the interest rates tend to rise. Central Banks usually pursue these actions in the case of innovations in their monetary policy (cf. Lavoie, 2014). viii The amount of loans is often changed by changing the criteria for belonging and identifying risk categories rather than the interest rates. A point at issue is, however, if a greater supply of loans requires a higher lending interest rate due to an increasing risk and worsening of the liquidity position of the banking system (cf. Pollin, 1991; Wray, 1990, 1995; Fontana, 2009, Minsky, 1982; Rousseaux, 1989). However, as Lavoie (2014) pointed out, except in the case of non-performing loans, the bank net interest revenues will bring the ratio of loans to own funds back to the previous level after an increase in loans. Moreover, a rise in the ratio of loans to bank deposits does not necessarily occur. Therefore, at least on a macroeconomic level, credit supply for a certain category of risk may be infinitely elastic.  ixFor an analysis in this direction, see Deleidi (2017). Note also that borrowing units may not use loans for final expenditure as the recent phenomenon in Europe of credit supply without investment shows us. x Since changes in the interest rates will influence the ratios ܴ/ܦ and ܥܷ/ܦ, money supply function is deemed to be, however, an increasing function of the interest rate (cf. Burger, 1971). xi Cagan and Friedman maintain that Fed system would not substantially alter the operation of gold standard, with the amount of gold shaping money supply and this supply determining the price level. During the cycle, however, while H increases due to the inflow of gold and Fed open market operations, cu and re rise due respectively to the conversion of deposits to currency and the lowering of the amount of loans. xii When the money multiplier is considered predictable and the warranted amount of money supply achievable (cf. Balbach, 1981; Bomhoff, 1977; Hafer, Hein, Kook, 1983; Johannes and Rasche, 1987), the loss of control on monetary aggregates is ascribed to erroneous estimates of the money multiplier and to Fed behaviour adding variability to real income and prices (cf. e.g. Metzler, 1982: 635). The unpredictability of money multiplier relates, however, to the management itself of the monetary base leading to variability of the interest rates (cf. Burns, 1974; and Moore, 1979). Note also that the elasticity of money supply to the interest rate is different for different monetary aggregates if it refers to short or long-term interest rates and for quarterly or annual data (cf. also Laffer and Miles: 1977).  xiiiFor more details on time series used, see Appendix A. xivFor instance, let us assume that the maximum order of integration for the group of time-series is ݀௠௔௫ . If there are two time series and one is I(1) and the other is I(2), then ݀௠௔௫ = 2. If one is I(0) and the other is I(1), then ݀௠௔௫ = 1. xv In this case, following the Taylor rule, Fed explicitly sets a target interest rate. Note that also between 1973 and 1979 Fed specified a monetary growth target but it was never fulfilled in order to stabilise the interest rates (cf. Balbach, 1981). xvi Of course, as stated in Section 2, it depends on a variety of circumstances, and primarily on the sensitiveness of aggregate demand to changes in the interest rates and to what extent Fed’s autonomous setting of the monetary base will affect money supply. In the period of time we have taken into account, these two monetary episodes tends, however, to disturb the direction of causality between the monetary base and money supply. xviiCritical tests such as the unit root test and the optimal lag selection are included in Appendix B of the paper. xviiiIf the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue are greater than the critical values and therefore significant, we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating equation. 
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                                                                                                                                                                  xixUnlike the VECM methodology, VAR methodology incorporates only short-run information. Consequently, the Granger non-Causality test applied in a VAR only allows as to study short-run relationships. 
